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Abstract  
 
I present a new hindcast stock market index for the United States over the twentieth 
century.  This is constructed by calibrating a rational asset pricing model that allows for 
a time-varying equity premium driven by heteroskedasticity in consumption growth.  By 
incorporating this variation in risk, the mean squared error of the generated index series, 
when compared to the observed levels of the S&P 500, is significantly reduced.  The 
model also explains well the broad magnitudes and timings of the major bull and bear 
markets of the twentieth century, particularly before 1973, and the excess volatility 
puzzle is largely resolved.  
 
 
 
 JEL Classifications: E21, G12, N21, N22. 
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I. Introduction 
 In this article, I argue that much of the low frequency behavior of the S&P 500 during 
the twentieth century can be explained through variations in the ex ante equity premium 
driven by changes in the consumption risk faced by stockholders.  In particular, the 
model has high explanatory power for the period up to the early 1970s.  The model 
performs less well for the stock market crash of 1973–1974, but average returns from the 
mid-1960s to the end of the century are well explained by the model.  
This article joins a stream of literature that examines whether observed low 
frequency market movements are consistent with a model of discounted dividends and 
rational investor behavior, where perhaps the most prominent puzzle has been the excess 
volatility anomaly of Shiller (1981) and LeRoy and Porter (1981).  To add to this debate, 
it is necessary to consider how the expected future growth rate of dividends and the cost 
of equity capital vary over time.  In this article, I focus on the second of these effects 
and my work is particularly related to the study by Lettau, Ludvigson, and Wachter 
(2008).  There has been a growing body of evidence, starting with Blanchard (1993) and 
subsequently examined by Jagannathan, McGrattan, and Scherbina (2000), Claus and 
Thomas (2001), and Fama and French (2002), among others, that the ex ante equity 
premium is considerably lower now than its long-term historic average.  Lettau, 
Ludvigson, and Wachter (2008) observe that there was a downward shift in consumption 
volatility in the second half of the twentieth century.  As investors learned about this,  
the ex ante equity premium fell, leading to the very strong stock market performance of 
the 1990s.  This article considers this argument over a much longer time frame by 
examining whether a changing equity premium, caused by time-varying consumption risk, 
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helped drive a number of the most significant market movements during the twentieth 
century. 
An insight into the intuition of this article is given in Lettau, Ludvigson, and 
Wachter (2008) and Bansal, Khatchatrian, and Yaron (2005).  They respectively note 
that GDP growth volatility and consumption growth volatility declined in the post-World 
War II (WWII) period and that this was associated with a rise in the price-dividend ratio 
at the time.  De Santis (2007) also observes that the ex ante equity premium fell in the 
post-WWII period, which was a period when macroeconomic risk was falling.  However, 
as stressed by Lettau et al., this apparent reduction in risk may purely result as a 
consequence of more accurate data measurement after WWII.   
To overcome this problem, I use income data from households with highest 
income to estimate changes in the macroeconomic risk faced by stockholders from just 
after World War I to 1998.  These data are available from Piketty and Saez (2003), and 
in contrast to aggregate consumption, consistency of measurement error is no longer an 
issue.  This enables me to look at the relation between macroeconomic risk and market 
returns over a much longer horizon than most previous studies without the concern that 
the results are driven by measurement error effects.  This advantage is also exploited by 
Buranawityawut, Freeman, and Freeman (2006). 
This article follows a similar method to Lettau, Ludvigson, and Wachter (2008).  
Consumption and income growth volatility are tested for a structural break over the 
whole data set.  Although such a transition become clear to the econometrician with the 
benefit of hindsight, investors could not have perfectly observed it contemporaneously.  
Therefore, within a regime-switching environment, I estimate when investors would have 
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learned about changes in macroeconomic risk.  Contingent on this learning process, 
“rational” asset prices can be calculated and compared with actual market behavior. 
The model is able to capture much of the low-frequency behavior of the S&P 500 
over the twentieth century.  When looking at the index in levels, the mean squared error 
is significantly reduced, in both an economically and statistically significant sense, when 
the model incorporates a time-varying equity premium.  The timings and magnitudes of 
the major booms and busts of the stock market, particularly before the early 1970s, can 
also be significantly better explained by allowing the equity premium to vary.  The 
1966–1981 bear market remains anomalous, but the 1982–1999 period brings the market 
back to levels consistent with the model.  The retrodicted annual standard deviation of 
market returns over the century is not different from the realized value at standard levels 
of statistical significance, largely resolving the excess volatility puzzle at this frequency. 
 
II. Changes in Aggregate Consumption Risk 
Income and Consumption Data 
My objective is to provide a rational market explanation for the low frequency behavior 
of the S&P 500 during the twentieth century.  I place particular emphasis on explaining 
the main stock market booms and busts as major changes in perceived consumption risk 
should significantly affect market levels within the framework of this article.  Bordo and 
Wheelock (2007) also call on a macroeconomic argument to explain such events, but 
their focus is on changes in monetary policy.  Barsky and De Long (1990) and White 
(1990) provide some qualitative perspectives on this issue.  Other empirical studies 
focusing on specific episodes include: (1) demographic arguments for the post-WWII and 
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1990s bull markets (e.g.; Bakshi and Chen 1994; Poterba 2004); (2) the arrival of new 
technology explaining the bear market of the 1970s and subsequent bull market of the 
1980s (Hobijn and Jovanovic 2001), and (3) dividend growth rate uncertainty accounting 
for the Nasdaq “bubble” (Pástor and Veronesi 2006).   
In this article, the principle driver of low frequency market returns is persistent 
changes in the equity premium.  The ex ante cost of equity is assumed to be driven by 
the conditional volatility of aggregate consumption growth.  This assumption is 
motivated by the Consumption Capital Asset Pricing Model (CCAPM).  Let ftit RR ,  
denote, respectively, the simple real return to a risky and a risk-free asset over the interval 
]1,[ tt  .  The CCAPM states that the ex ante risk premium, ][1 ftitt RRE   is 
approximated by:  
 )()(),(][ 1111 cttittctittftitt rRrRRRE     (1) 
where   is the coefficient of relative risk aversion; )/(ln= 1ttct ccr ; tc  is aggregate 
per-capita real consumption; ),(   is the correlation coefficient; and )(  is the 
standard deviation operator.
1
  As )(1 ctt r  changes, so does the equity premium, ceteris 
paribus. 
To look for empirical evidence of changes in aggregate consumption risk, 
aggregate real consumption for nondurables and services data are taken directly from 
Robert Shiller's website (http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm).  Initial, 
                                                     
1
 There is a significant literature that considers the role that changing conditional market volatility might 
play in determining the equity premium; see, for example, Kim, Morley, and Nelson (2004, 2005) and the 
references therein.  Gordon and St-Amour (2000), amongst others, look at time variation in the coefficient 
  7 
unreported, exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) estimates of conditional 
variance clearly demonstrate a one-off major decline in risk occurring in the immediate 
aftermath of WWII.  However, as stressed by Lettau, Ludvigson, and Wachter (2008), 
this feature may result purely from a reduction in measurement error. 
To eliminate this potential problem, the annual income data described in detail in 
Piketty and Saez (2003) are also examined from 1913 to 1998.  Although it is known 
that income is a poor proxy for consumption, I show in the Appendix that drawing 
inferences about the equity premium from income growth volatility is robust within a 
permanent income hypothesis setting.  The main advantage of this approach is that it 
enables us to look at the relation between macroeconomic risk and market returns over a 
much longer horizon than previous studies without the concern that the results are driven 
by measurement error effects.  As Piketty and Saez (2003, page 12) note: “The fact that 
the top shares are very smooth after 1945 and bumpy before is therefore not an artefact of 
an increase in the accuracy of the data (in fact, the data are more detailed before World 
War II than after), but reflects real changes in economic conditions.”  
Piketty and Saez (2003) take income from annual tax return statistics compiled by 
the IRS for different tax units (married couples and single adults with dependents).  Data 
are for all income shown on tax returns, gross of personal tax, and excluding capital gains.  
Average incomes by fractiles in real terms for each year are reported.  P90-95, for 
example, represents the average income from households who were in the top 10%, but 
not the top 5%, of households by income in that tax year.   Descriptive statistics for the 
logarithmic growth in real income for each income fractile and aggregate real per-capita 
                                                                                                                                                              
of risk aversion in a related context. 
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consumption are given in Table 1. 
 
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
 
Unreported EWMA estimates for the conditional standard deviation of 
logarithmic growth in real income for various income fractiles again provide evidence of 
a “high risk” state in the pre-WWII years and a “low risk” state after the middle of the 
1960s.  In this case, though, for the highest income households (P99–99.5 and above), 
there is an apparent reversion to the high risk state in the late 1980s.  This period saw a 
significant relative redistribution of wealth with those with highest incomes doing 
exceptionally well.  For example, in the years 1987–1988  fractile P99.99–100 had a 
real rise in income of over 76%.  The rise in conditional volatility in the late 1980s 
therefore appears to reflect a permanent change in the level of income rather than its risk.  
This view is supported by the facts that: (1) there is no observable increase in risk at this 
time for lower income households.  It seems unlikely that a source of economic risk 
should emerge that would only affect the rich but have no significant impact on the poor, 
(2) from 1989–1998, income growth of the highest fractiles was relatively smooth, and (3) 
1987–88 were very strong years for the stock market, suggesting that investors viewed 
this period positively. 
 
Identifying Regime Shifts in Consumption Risk 
I take a similar approach to identifying changes in consumption and income growth 
volatility to that described in Lettau, Ludvigson, and Wachter (2008).  First, structural 
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break in variance tests are run to help formalize the stylized results presented above; that 
macroeconomic risk was substantially higher before WWII than afterwards.  I then turn 
to a regime-switching environment to consider how investors might have learned in real 
time about changes in risk. 
For many of the income series used in this study there are only approximately 70 
observations.  As Lettau, Ludvigson, and Wachter (2008) note, the estimation of 
regime-switching models based on the method of Hamilton (1989) requires a large 
number of data points.  As a consequence, alternative estimation methods are used for 
the main calibrations in this article, which are subsequently supported by the use of 
regime-switching MSVAR models and detailed sensitivity analysis. 
To retrospectively identify a single structural change in variance, I use the method 
of Inclán and Tiao (1994).  This technique has been used in a finance context by, for 
example, Aggarwal, Inclan, and Leal (1999) and Wang and Moore (2009).  I also use 
the procedure of Chen and Gupta (1997), which has similar power.  These tests are 
applied to the aggregate consumption series and eight income series in Table 1.  For log 
consumption growth the time interval is 1890–2000.  For income series P0-90, P90-95 
and P95-99 the time period is 1918–1998.  This is the total sample in Piketty and Saez 
(2003).  For all other income series, the time interval is 1914–1986, apart from P95–100 
which starts in 1918.  I truncate these series in 1986 to avoid the “false” apparent rise in 
risk at the end of the 1980s discussed in the previous subsection. 
Panel A of Table 2 presents evidence for a single structural change in volatility 
based on the real logarithmic growth of each consumption and income series.  In each 
case, p values are given associated with rejecting the null of no structural break.  
  10 
However, as shown in Table 1, there is considerable autocorrelation in the growth rate of 
many of the series.  As both the Inclán and Tiao (1994) and Chen and Gupta (1997) tests 
assume that the data have zero autocorrelation and a constant mean, residuals from 
Autoregressive Moving Average (ARMA) models for the real log growth rate of each 
series are also tested for structural breaks in volatility and the results are presented in 
Panel B of Table 2.   Brief details of the ARMA model used in each case are given in 
Table 1.  
 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
 
In all cases in Panels A and B of Table 2, the null hypothesis can be rejected with 
statistical significance of less than 1%.  Although there are some disagreements about 
the exact timing of the break, all series and both tests place it within the interval 
1936–1959.   
Panel C of Table 2 provides information on the standard deviation of the ARMA 
residuals before and after the identified date of the structural break, which is taken to be 
the average of the two dates identified by the Inclán and Tiao (1994) and Chen and Gupta 
(1997) tests based on these data.  Although taking an average in this way is somewhat 
ad hoc, the low sensitivity of the main results to this assumption is discussed below.  
The sharp decline in risk between the first and second halves of the century is clearly 
revealed. 
Panel D of Table 2 reports the structural breaks in volatility identified by the 
MSVAR package, written by Krolzig in Ox, that uses a maximum likelihood EM 
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algorithm.  This is run on the ARMA residuals using the MSIAH(2)-AR(0) model.  
These results support the earlier findings.  For all series except P95–99 the findings are 
similar to the previous three panels.  For P95–99, the MSVAR approach identifies 
multiple structural breaks in volatility.   
In this article, following Veronesi (1999), it is assumed that investors cannot 
perfectly identify the underlying state that prevails at the time.  To consider how 
investors would have drawn inferences about the current state, I turn to a Bayesian 
learning regime-switching model.  The estimation technique is closely related to that 
described by Moore and Schaller (2002) and Brandt, Zeng, and Zhang (2004).  Investors 
know that the ARMA residuals of the real logarithmic growth rate for any given income 
or consumption series, ct , are described by: 
 ststs
s
ct  )(=
2
1


 (2) 
where s  denotes the mean residual of income or consumption growth in state s ; and 
)(0, 2sst N   .  There are assumed to be two states with indicator dummy variable 
{0,1},st  where state 1 (2) is the high (low) risk state and tt 12 1=    for all t .  
Investors also know that the transition probability matrix is given by: 
 









1
1
 (3) 
It is assumed that investors have always known the five parameter values ,s  
2
s , and 
 .  For estimation purposes s  and 
2
s  are taken from the mean and variance of ct  
before and after the identified structural break date given in Panel C of Table 2, where the 
values of s  are also reported.  All values of s  are close to zero as expected given 
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that ct  are residuals.   
For this Markov switching process, the expected time of first transition from one 
state to the other is )(11
1=
 

 tt t  =  
1)(1  .  For the base calibration the 
expected time to the next change in state is 50 years, which appears consistent with one 
major shift in macroeconomic volatility over the last century, setting 98%= .  This 
value is also supported by the MSVAR maximum likelihood estimates of the transition 
parameters.  For P95–100, which is the income series used in the baseline calibrations 
below, the estimated values are 0.9712=  for state 1 and 1.000=  for state 2.  For 
consumption data the values are 0.9802=  and 1.000=  for states 1 and 2 
respectively.  Although state 2 appears to be absorbing, empirically estimating   in 
this state when there has only been one observed switch in the data (from state 1 to state 2) 
is clearly problematic.  As a consequence, setting 0.98=  for both states is broadly 
consistent with these estimates.  In the sensitivity analysis described below, other values 
of  are investigated.   
The variables that investors cannot observe are st .  Therefore they have to 
draw inferences about these variables.  If 1t  denotes the information that investors 
have available to them at time 1t  then )(1 sPt  =  Prob )|1=( 1tst ; the probability 
that an investor assigns at time 1t  to being in state s  at time t .  As there are only 
two states, (2)1tP  (1)1= 1 tP .  According to Bayes rule: 
  
1)=|((2)1)=|((1)
1)=|()(
=|1=Prob
2111
1
tctttctt
stctt
tst
fPfP
fsP






  (4) 
where 1)=|( stctf   is the probability density function for a normal distribution 
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),( 2ssN   and: 
    tsttstt sP  |0=Prob)(1|1=Prob=)(   (5) 
For aggregate consumption, the starting probability of being in the high risk state 
0.5=(1)1889P ; the analysis is neutral about whether the economy starts in a high risk or 
low risk state.  This setting contrasts with the type of learning process described by 
Cogley and Sargent (2008).  They argue that the aftermath of the Great Depression 
caused investors to have an exaggerated fear of future depressions.  This fear has slowly 
declined over time to more rational levels, leading to a reduction in the market price of 
risk.  They, therefore, deliberately “inject an initial dose of pessimism” into their 
framework; something that is not required here as the results presented in this article are 
highly insensitive to the choice of prior.  Within five years, and before any results are 
reported, the estimated value of 97.99%=(1)1894P , which is almost the highest possible 
value of 98% . 
For the income series, which all begin after the aggregate consumption series, the 
starting value of (1)startP  is set equal to the Bayesian probability from the aggregate 
consumption data for that year.  The probabilities of being in the high-risk state for the 
aggregate consumption series and three income series are presented in Figure I. 
 
[Insert Figure I around here] 
 
The intuition behind this article is clear from this figure.  The consumption data 
quickly recognize that the start of the twentieth century was a time of high risk.  All 
series then identify a reduction in risk during the 1920s, which helps explain the 
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magnitude of the 1920s bull market.  Perceived macroeconomic risk then rises sharply 
during the Great Depression, offsetting the decline in the cost of equity in the previous 
decade and amplifying the effect of the bear market at this time.  Finally, all series 
recognize the reduction in risk in the period around the middle of the century.  This 
explains the strong secular bull market of the post-WWII period. 
In unreported results, the values of (1)tP  as estimated for P95–100 and the 
aggregate consumption series are shown to be highly similar to the smoothed regime 
probabilities estimated from the MSVAR approach.  The values of (1)tP  used in the 
asset pricing model of the next section are from the P95–100 series for the years 
1917–1986.  This series is preferred because, particularly in the first two-thirds of the 
last century, those with highest income held the greatest proportion of stocks (see, in 
particular, Blume, Crockett, and Friend 1974; Poterba and Samwick 1995).  Also, by 
inspection of Figure I, it appears to be neither an early nor a late indicator of the decline 
in risk in the post-WWII period.  For the period before 1917 and after 1986, 
probabilities from aggregate consumption are taken.
2
 
 
III. The Asset Pricing Model 
For the calibrations, three data series are used for annual stock returns and dividends over 
the period 1872–1999.  The main calibrations are based on data from Wilson and Jones 
(2002), henceforth W&J, and from Robert Shiller's website.  For further robustness, data 
are also taken from Global Financial Data (GFD).  For W&J and GFD, end of year data 
                                                     
2
 By construction, the data splice perfectly in 1917.  In 1986, there is only a small difference between the 
values of (1)tP  for P95-100 and aggregate consumption and no attempt is made to adjust for this. 
  15 
are taken.  Shiller's annual data, though, are for January.  I therefore consider the 
lagged series “Shiller+1” , when stock price data for January 1950, for example, is used 
for the year 1949, but the dividend for 1950 is kept in year 1950.  For the W&J and 
GFD series, the price and dividend series are deflated using the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) deflator from GFD.  For Shiller, real prices and dividends are taken directly from 
his spreadsheet.  There are very high correlations between the real logarithmic total 
returns calculated for the three series over the period 1897–1999 (99.5% between W&J 
and GFD, 96.5% between W&J and Shiller+1).  The correlation between the real 
logarithmic dividend growth series over the sample is also high (89.9% between W&J 
and GFD, 86.5% between W&J and Shiller+1). 
A further adjustment is made to the dividend series.  Because of the rapid rise in 
share repurchases towards the end of the century, for every year after 1972 (the first year 
for which aggregate repurchase data are available) the dividend series is multiplied by a 
repurchase adjuster.  This is calculated from Grullon and Michaely (2002).
3
 
The asset pricing model used in this article is based upon Ang and Liu (2004).  
Full details are given in the Appendix, where it is also shown that similar results, both in 
terms of price levels and returns, are obtained when using the log-linear model of 
Campbell and Shiller (1988) in place of the one described here.   
From Ang and Liu (2004), the net present value, tp , of an asset with dividend 
                                                     
3
 For each year t after 1971, the adjuster is defined by (Stock Repurchases + Dividends) /t Dividends t .  
The dividend series is then multiplied by Adjuster /t Adjuster 1972.  It should be noted that there is some 
disagreement about the absolute level of aggregate stock repurchases.  See, for example, Weston & Siu 
(2003). 
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stream td  is given by 
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dp
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mdEp
 (6) 
The expected simple single period return is comprised of a risk-free component kftr   
and a risk premium, kt , so that )(1ln= ktkftkt rm    .  Taking a first order 
Taylor's series approximation of this around kt 1  gives ktm   
)/(1)(1ln ktkftkt r    .)(1ln kftkt r      In addition, )(exp= 1= kt
j
ktjt
gdd    
where ktg  = )/(ln 1 ktkt dd , so that: 
 














 

 kftktkt
j
k
t
j
tt rgEdp )(1lnexp
=1=1
  (7) 
This is a standard discounted dividend model with a time-varying cost of capital.  
I assume that the risk premium is independent of kftkt rg   , including at all leads and 
lags. 
Table 3 presents summary statistics for ftr , tg , and ftt rg  .  Data for both the 
nominal risk-free rate (the Treasury bills return index) and CPI are taken from Global 
Financial Data to determine the real risk-free rate, ftr .  This variable could, in principle, 
be treated endogenously within the type of theoretical framework that forms the basis for 
this article.  Here, though, the observed real risk-free rate is used.  In addition, dividend 
growth and the risk-free rate could be modeled separately.  However, because real 
dividend growth is considerably more volatile than the real risk-free rate, kftkt rg    has 
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a correlation of 93% with ktg  .  Therefore, for simplicity, kftkt rg    is modeled as a 
single series, and unreported tests suggest that the results I present have low sensitivity to 
this choice.  Although the chi-squared statistics in Table 3 indicate that this is not the 
case, it is also assumed for tractability that this series is normally distributed.  Under 
these assumptions: 
 
  1
=1
=1
1
2
1
exp












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kt
j
k
tjt
jt
''
j
tt
E
dp

jtjjtjj 1S1m1
 (8) 
j1  is a j vector of 1s. tjm  is a j vector with elements  kftktt rgE    and tjS  is 
a jj  variance-covariance matrix with elements  'kft'ktkftktt rgrgCov   ,  for 
]1,[, jkk '  . 
 
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
 
An important proposed resolution for the excess volatility paradox is that dividend 
growth is highly persistent; see, for example, Barsky and De Long (1993).  Donaldson 
and Kamstra (1996) also use a model with persistent dividend growth rates to get a very 
close fit for the observed stock market behavior of the 1920s and 1930s.  However, the 
integrated dividend growth process of Barsky and De Long (1993) has come under 
criticism both for the lack of empirical support (Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay 1997) and 
theoretical inconsistency (Pagès 1999).  This article follows Bansal and Lundblad (2002) 
by allowing for dividend growth predictability using an ARMA process. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests, reported in Table 3, reject the null hypothesis of 
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there being a unit root in the series kftkt rg    with levels of significance well below 1%.  
For all three data sets, the dividend growth minus risk-free rate series can be well 
modeled by an MA(1) process: 
 ttftt rg   110=  (9) 
Estimates of 1ˆ  provide statistically significant evidence of autocorrelation in the 
dividend growth process for the W&J and GFD data but not for Shiller's data.  Even in 
the case of W&J and GFD, the autocorrelation is not particularly strong from an 
economic perspective with 0.25<ˆ1 .  This conclusion is also confirmed by the 
first-order autocorrelation statistics reported in Table 3.  The finding that dividend 
growth rates have only limited predictablity over one year and almost no predictability 
more than one year ahead is also supported by the multivariate regression results reported 
in Fama and French (2002).  Under this MA(1) process, it is straightforward to prove 
that, if j  is defined by:  
   )(0.51)(0.5exp= 121220    jjj  (10) 
then equation (8) becomes: 
   jtj
j
ttt dp   

=1
1exp  (11) 
In the case where there is both constant dividend growth 0,==)( 2tVar  so 
)(exp= 0jj , and a constant equity premium, ,  so ,)(1=
j
jt
   then tp  =  
))(exp)/(1(exp 00  td .  This, as expected, is the standard static Gordon Growth 
model.  In the case when there is a constant equity premium, ,)(1=
j
jt
   but there 
is non-constant dividend growth, 0=)(
2 tVar , then it is straightforward to show 
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that: 
 
 
   12120
2
01
10.5exp1
0.5exp
=





t
tt dp  (12) 
The t1  term incorporates into the price the one-period ahead forecastability of 
dividend growth.  The 2  terms capture Itô effects from jtjj 1S1
'
2
1
 in equation (8).  
This version of the model will be referred to as the “partial model”. 
When there is both time-varying dividend growth and equity premium, referred to 
as the “full model” , no simple closed form solution for tp  is available.  The Appendix 
describes in detail how jtjj 

1=
 can be empirically estimated in this case.  In 
particular, it is proved that, to high accuracy, this variable can be modeled as linear in 
(1)tP .  As a consequence: 
   )(1)(exp 2121 xxPxdp tttt    (13) 
where 1x  and 2x  are constants that can be broadly interpreted as average price / 
dividend ratios in the two states.  The values of these variables depend on the MA(1) 
parameters for dividend growth, the transition probability  , and particularly ),(s  
which are the values that the single-period equity premium would take if the true state 
next period were revealed immediately to investors. For calibration purposes, the values 
of 1x  and 2x  are estimated by Monte Carlo simulation and, from there, determining 
rational asset prices follows immediately from equation (13). 
To complete the calibration of 1x  and 2x  it is necessary to estimate values of 
the single period equity premium in the two states, )(s . For the base calibrations, I use 
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8%=(1) , which is broadly consistent with, for example, Cornell (1999) who suggests 
that a risk premium of 7% over bonds and 9% over bills is a good rough approximation of 
a forward looking equity premium.  I set 3.5%=(2) , which is low when compared 
with current survey estimates of the ex ante equity premium of around 5.5% reported in 
Welch (2008), but consistent with studies such as Claus and Thomas (2001).  These two 
values of the equity premium can also be compared with the realized returns over the 
periods 1897–1951 and 1959–1987.  These dates are chosen as the estimates of (1)tP  
are relatively steady during these periods.  1952–1958 represents the strong shift in risk 
in the post-WWII period.  1988–1999 captures the third, even lower, risk state described 
in section V of this article.   These periods provide estimates of =(1)  7.3% and 
=(2) 4.2%.  Again, this is clear evidence of a reduction in the equity premium, albeit 
less than the 8.0% to 3.5% used in the baseline calibration of the article.  Sensitivity 
analysis is presented for (1)  and (2)  below as there is considerable disagreement in 
the literature concerning estimates of the pre-break and post-break equity premia.  In 
particular, this will focus on =(1)  7.0% and =(2) 4.5%, which are close to the ex 
post estimates. 
The baseline calibration values of 8%=(1)  and   3.5%=2  can also be 
compared with the equity premium that would be justified by the CCAPM as given in 
equation (1).  Based on estimates of ),( ctit rR , )( itR , and )( ctr  for the periods 
1897–1951 and 1959–1987, (1)  and (2)  imply that the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion, ,  is equal to 17  for state 1 and 38  for state 2.  These values of   would 
be viewed by most economists as being above realistic estimates of the coefficient of 
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relative risk aversion for the majority of investors.  This is a re-statement of the equity 
premium puzzle of Mehra and Prescott (1985).  If, though, an economist did view 
17=  as a realistic estimate, then this would theoretically justify setting   1.61%=2 .  
This gives some credence to the view that the calibrated change in the equity premium 
between the two states is being underestimated in the baseline calibration. The focus of 
this article remains on explaining observed low frequency stock market movements based 
on standard empirical, as opposed to theoretically justified, estimates of the equity 
premium.   
 
IV. Results 
The S&P 500 in Levels 
Figure II presents the observed real level of the stock market from 1889–2000 in logs and 
the retrodicted values from five rational asset pricing models.  This replicates Shiller 
(2003, Figure 1) with hindcast values from both the full and partial models superimposed.  
For the partial model, 8%=(1)=  .  Shiller (2003) presents three series of rational 
prices.  The first, “PDV, Constant Discount Rate” , is derived from his original 1981 
model.  The second, “PDV, Interest Rate” , varies the discount rate in line with changes 
in the one-year real interest rate.  The final series is derived from the model of 
Grossman and Shiller (1981), where the discount rate varies with the marginal rate of 
substitution of aggregate consumption, which is assumed to be perfectly forecastable. 
 
[Insert Figure II around here] 
 
  22 
The high explanatory power of the full model, particularly in the period before 
1973, is clearly revealed.  Although the Grossman and Shiller (1981) model captures the 
Wall Street Crash with some accuracy, not one of Shiller's series comes close to 
reflecting the observed volatility of the market over the total sample; this is the puzzle he 
sets.  In contrast, the full model broadly captures all the major movements, both in terms 
of magnitude and timing, in the period before the 1973–1974 stock market crash. 
Figure III compares the price / dividend (p/d) ratio of the full and partial models 
against the observed values, based on Shiller's data. 
 
[Insert Figure III around here] 
 
For the partial model, the retrodicted p/d ratio is almost flat.  This is because 
there is very little dividend forecastability based on annual data and aggregate dividends 
are smooth.  As a consequences,   1exp 1 t  for all t  and the p/d ratio, from 
equation (12), is approximately constant.  The correlation between the observed and 
retrodicted p/d ratio from the partial model is only 2% over the total sample period 
1897–1999.  For the full model, the p/d ratio is approximately equal to 
)(1)( 212 xxPx t  .  Again, the ability of the full model to explain low-frequency returns, 
particularly in the 1920s, 1930s, 1950s and 1960s, is clearly revealed, as is its inability to 
explain the period following the 1973 stock market crash.  The p/d ratio of the full 
model has a correlation of 61%  with the observed p/d ratio over the period 1897–1999. 
Figure III also includes a “perfect knowledge” retrodicted p/d series that shows 
the importance to this article of Veronesi's (1999) assumption that investors cannot 
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perfectly identify the current state.  In contrast to the full model, the “perfect 
knowledge” case assumes that investors could instantaneously identify the structural 
break in 1949 reported in Panel C of Table 2 for the P95–100 series without the need to 
draw inferences using Bayes rule; Prob 1=)|1=( 1 tt   before 1950 and 
Prob 0=)|1=( 1 tt   thereafter.  As can be seen from Figure III, this retrodicted p/d 
series has a sharp, instantaneous rise, from 18.9 in 1949 to 32.7 in 1950.  This contrasts 
with the full model where investors take several years to fully learn about the change in 
states and therefore the p/d ratio does not rise above 30 until 1959 which better matches 
the observed data.  The full model also performs noticeably better than the perfect 
knowledge model early in the century as the correlation between the observed p/d ratio 
and the retrodicted p/d ratio for the perfect knowledge series is 52% for the total sample 
period 1897–1999.  Lettau, Ludvigson, and Wachter (2008) also exploit this advantage 
of gradual discovery in a highly related context.  The use of Bayesian learning in this 
article should therefore be contrasted with its more common application in financial 
econometrics, where it is generally assumed that investors have full contemporaneous 
knowledge about the underlying state but that econometricians have access to a much 
more limited set of information.  Bayes rule is then used as the foundation for a number 
of empirical techniques that generate ex post estimates of the regimes. 
To determine whether the information contained in the conditional volatility of 
consumption and income growth is statistically significant in helping to explain the level 
of the S&P 500 index over the twentieth century, a Monte Carlo approach is taken over 
1000 iterations. 
For each year 1889–2000 within each iteration, a value is taken at random, with 
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replication, from the observed time series of consumption growth.  Income data are not 
used in the Monte Carlo process as they are only available for part of the sample. When 
randomizing the data, splicing income and consumption estimates is problematic. For 
each randomly generated consumption series, the Inclán and Tiao and Chen and Gupta 
tests are used to test for a single structural break in volatility.  The identified date of the 
break for each iteration is the average of the two dates identified by the two tests 
irrespective of the level of statistical significance.  If the identified break is in either the 
first or last decade, the iteration is discarded and replaced.  Conditional on the break 
date, values of s , s  and )(sPt  are calculated as before.  The single period equity 
premium in each state is given by =)(s  s1.8018285180.00740803  .
4
  Equation 
(13) can then be used to generate 1000 Monte Carlo price series based on the randomized 
consumption growth data.  To establish the accuracy of each price series, the error 
   observedestimated lnln= ttt pp   is calculated for each year.  A mean squared error,  
 
2000
1889
2 /112
t t
 , can then be determined for each price series and a p value for the full 
model established. 
An advantage of this method of estimating p values is that it helps overcome a 
potential look-ahead bias.  In the calibration process, it has been assumed that the main 
parameters ( s , 
2
s ,  , )(s , 0 , 1  and 
2
 ), while estimated ex post, have 
                                                     
4
 This formula ensures that when 4.03%=1  and 1.53%=2 , which represent the standard deviation 
of consumption growth in the two states as given in Table 2, then 8%=(1)  and 3.5%=(2) .  It also 
means that the greater the change in consumption growth volatility between the two states, the greater the 
difference in the equity premia. 
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always been in the investors' information set.  As the same method is used to generate 
each of the Monte Carlo price series as the full model, this assumption applies in all cases.  
A statistically significant p value for the full model cannot, then, be explained away by 
the look-ahead bias. 
The full model in Figure II has a lower mean squared error than 99.9% of the 
1000 Monte Carlo price series.
5
  This shows to a very high degree of statistical 
significance that the conditional volatility of income and consumption growth is 
informative for understanding low frequency movements in the S&P 500. 
 
Bull and Bear Markets 
If changes in the ex ante equity premium are truly driving low frequency movements in 
the S&P 500, it follows that large increases and decreases in (1)tP  should have driven 
the major stock market busts and booms of the twentieth century.  As a consequence, the 
full model should have excellent ability to explain average returns over individual 
historic secular bull and bear markets. 
To test this hypothesis, it is necessary to identify the dates when each market 
cycle began and ended.  There are a number of previous studies that examine the timing 
                                                     
5
 Two different sets of tests of statistical significance were also run.  In the first, the value of )(s  is 
always set equal to 8% in the high risk state and 3.5% in the low risk state.  In the second, the mean 
squared error is calculated by   


 20001889 /112
2
t t
  where    
2000
1889 /112= t t .  This adjusts 
for systematic over- or under-valuation by the model.  In all cases, the full model outperforms at least 
99.6% of the random series.  When the data is truncated at 1973, the full model always outperforms all the 
random series. 
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of bull and bear markets, including Pagan and Sossounov (2003) and Gonzalez et al. 
(2005).  The tendency, though, is to use monthly data in the analysis.  As a 
consequence, the average durations of bull and bear markets are too short to be relevant 
for a study based on annual data. 
To decide on the timings of secular bull and bear markets using annual data, I use 
the counts cusum technique described in Gonzalez et al. (2006).  There is considerable 
agreement between the W&J, GFD and Shiller+1 series over when the bull and bear 
markets occur and these timings agree with other sources, such as the dates given by 
Michael Alexander (http://www.safehaven.com/article-68.htm).  Bull markets for the 
twentieth century are taken to run from 1897–1905, 1922–1928, 1949–1965 and 
1982–1999, with bear markets making up the intervening periods.   
Observed and retrodicted average returns over each major market cycle are 
presented in Table 4.  Panel A presents the base parameterization based on Wilson and 
Jones (2002) data.  There are seven columns.  The first gives the observed average real 
annual logarithmic capital gain to the stock market during each identified secular bull and 
bear market.  Dividends are excluded as they are an input into the model.  The next six 
columns present the retrodicted average real annual logarithmic capital growth based on 
three variants of the model together with associated p values.  The partial model is 
based on equation (12), when the equity premium is fixed at 8%.  The full model has a 
time-varying equity premium and is based on equation (13).  The “Consump.” model is 
also based on this equation, but values of (1)tP  are estimated from consumption data 
alone as shown in Figure I.  p values are calculated from the Monte Carlo process 
described in the previous subsection where the consumption growth data have been 
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randomized.  The values represent the percentage of the 1000 Monte Carlo price series 
that have a lower absolute error than the model in explaining observed average returns for 
each market cycle. 
 
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
 
Unsurprisingly, the partial model does not perform particularly well, with 
p values being close to 50% in all cases.  By contrast, the full model shows strong 
explanatory power.  For all seven booms and busts, it explains average returns better 
than the partial model.  The power of the full model is particularly revealed in the period 
before 1966.  For example, for the 1922–1928 bull market, when observed real growth 
averaged 16.2%  per year, the full model hindcasts 12.0%  while the partial model only 
retrodicts 7.8% .  Similarly, for the 1949–1965 bull market, the retrodicted average 
annual real capital gains from the full and partial models are 6.9%  and 3.9%  against 
an observed figure of 8.6% .  That the model has explanatory ability for average returns 
is established at 10% significance for the 1906–1921 bear market, 2% significance for the 
1897–1905 bull market and 1% significance for the bear market of 1929–1948 and bull 
markets of 1922–1928 and 1949–1965.6 
The second part of the table also shows that the Wall Street Crash of 1929–1932 
                                                     
6
 In the Monte Carlo iterations, =)(s  s1.8018285180.00740803   as above.  p values were also 
calculated in the case when the single period equity premium always equals 8% in the high risk state and 
3.5% in the low risk state.  In this case, the full model is significant at the 10% level for 1897–1905, the 
5% level for 1929–1948 and the 1% level for 1922–1928 and 1949–1965. 
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is very well explained by the full model, when the observed, full model and partial model 
average annual real capital gains are -26.5%, -19.0% and -10.8% respectively. The fall in 
dividends and expected future dividend growth is enhanced by a sharp rise in the equity 
premium caused by the associated macroeconomic risk of the Great Depression. 
With the exception of the 1929–1948 bear market, similar results are achieved 
whether we base estimates of (1)tP  on income or consumption data.  However, the 
consumption-based model performs poorly for this bear market, with a p value of over 
80%.  The second part of the table shows that the consumption data can explain the Wall 
Street Crash, but not the falling market of 1937–1948.  This is because, under the 
consumption parameters, macroeconomic risk was perceived to be falling at this time; see 
Figure I. 
Panels B and C present similar results for the full model based on different data 
sets.  Some even more supportive findings for the time-varying equity premium model 
appear here.  For example, based on the GFD data, the observed and retrodicted values 
for the 1922–1928 bull market are 17.3%  and 15.4%  respectively. 
The final part of the table examines the volatility of the market over the whole 
sample and two fairly even sub-samples divided by the end of the 1929–1948 secular 
bear market.  Over the total sample, the observed standard deviation is 19.5%, while the 
full model hindcasts 17.4%.  An F-test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the 
variance of the full model's capital returns is equal to the variance of observed capital 
returns at the one-sided 10% level.  The same null hypothesis is rejected at the one-sided 
2% level for the partial model, where the standard deviation is 15.9% over the total 
sample.  There is therefore only limited evidence of excess market volatility when 
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persistent changes in the equity premium are recognized. 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
I now demonstrate that the economic conclusions of this article have low sensitivity to 
large changes in input values. 
Two of the driving variables for this model are the assumed levels of the equity 
premium in the two states, ),(s  and the persistency of those states, captured by  .  
Panel A of Table 5 presents results for 0.9= , 95.0  and 0.99 .  These correspond to 
an expected time to a first change in state of 10, 20 and 100 years respectively.  All 
other values are as for the base case parameterization.  The greater the value of  , the 
better the model is at explaining the magnitude of the secular bull and bear markets, 
particularly in the 1922–1965 period.  This finding is consistent with previous literature 
that shows that persistence, be it either in dividend growth rates or changes in the cost of 
capital, is crucial for generating the extreme movements observed in stock prices.  For 
all values of   considered, the full model has a lower absolute forecasting error for all 
seven of the secular bull and bear markets of the twentieth century than the partial model.   
 
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
 
Panel B of Table 5 presents results for {7%,9%}(1)  and 
}{2.5%,4.5%(2)  with 0.98= .  The model performs best in this case with the 
greatest difference in equity premium between the two states; 9%=(1)  and 
2.5%=(2) .  The average level of equity premium has an important impact on the 
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estimated dividend yields of the market in the two states, 1x  and 2x , but a much smaller 
effect on hindcast returns.  Again, for all values of (1) , )2(  considered, the full 
model has a lower absolute forecasting error for all seven secular bull and bear markets 
than the partial model. 
The case 7%=(1)  and 4.5%=(2)  is of particular interest as these values 
are close to the ex post estimates of the equity premium over the intervals 1897–1951 and 
1959–1987 respectively.  The Monte Carlo simulations were rerun in this case to see if 
the full model continues to have statistically significant explanatory power. 
When retrodicting the S&P 500 in levels, the model has a lower mean squared 
error under this calibration than under the baseline calibration.  This is because, with the 
equity premium in state 2 now raised, the model overpredicts market values by less in the 
period after 1973.  As a consequence the full model performs better than all 1,000 of the 
Monte Carlo simulations when the index is examined in levels. 
When explaining low frequency returns, the full model performs more poorly 
under this calibration than under the baseline calibration, but still clearly has explanatory 
power that is significant in both a statistical and economic sense.  The p values are 
below 1% for the bull markets of 1922–1928 and 1949–1965 and the bear market of 
1929–1948, below 5% for the bull market of 1897–1905 and below 10% for the bear 
market of 1906–1921.7  
                                                     
7
 In the Monte Carlo iterations, =)(s  s1.0010160.02967113 , giving 7%=(1)  and 
4.5%=(2)  when substituting in the observed level of consumption growth volatility in the two states.  
p values were also calculated in the case when the single period equity premium always equals 7% in 
the high risk state and 4.5% in the low risk state.  In this case, the p value is significant at the 5% for 
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Next, I consider how the estimation process for (1)tP  might have influenced the 
results.  This parameter is a function of s  and s .  These are empirically estimated 
by the pre-break and post-break mean and standard deviation of the ARMA residuals of 
the real log growth rate in the consumption or income series.  Therefore, (1)tP  depends 
on the assumed date of the structural break.  A somewhat ad-hoc process was used to 
determine this in Panel C of Table 2, where the average of the dates identified by the 
Inclán and Tiao (1994) and Chen and Gupta (1997) break tests was chosen.  To test for 
robustness, values for (1)tP  were re-estimated for series P95–100 based on the 
structural break being in 1939 and 1959.  These dates are chosen to be one decade 
earlier and later respectively than the date used in the main calibration.  The estimated 
values of (1)tP  are found in unreported results to be highly insensitive to the assumed 
date of the break.  Instead, as shown in Figure I, these values are much more sensitive to 
the data series used in the analysis.  The asset pricing model was also re-calibrated using 
the values of (1)tP  from two different income series; P0–90 and P90–95.  In general, 
the full model is slightly less accurate for both of these series than when (1)tP  is 
estimated using P95–100.  Despite this, both versions of the model have a lower 
absolute forecasting error than the partial model for six of the seven secular bull and bear 
markets.  The exception is 1966–1981, but this is a period that even the main calibration 
fails to accurately capture.   
Finally, I fit the series 11   ftt rg  using AR(1), MA(2) and ARMA(1,1) processes 
as opposed to the MA(1) process in the main calibration.  The results are shown, in 
                                                                                                                                                              
1929–1948 and at the 1% level for 1922–1928 and 1949–1965. 
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unreported results, to be highly insensitive to the way in which the dividend growth series 
is ARMA modeled. 
 
V. 1966–1999 
This study has, so far, focused on movements in the cost of equity capital in the early- to 
mid-twentieth century.  Lettau, Ludvigson, and Wachter (2008), amongst others, have 
argued that the equity premium declined much more recently.  I now extend the full 
model to allow for the possibility of a third, even lower risk, state between 1966 and 1999.  
The enhanced model can be calibrated using higher frequency data as measurement error 
in consumption data is of less concern in this period. 
For this post-war period, seasonally adjusted real monthly data for the 
consumption of nondurables and services are taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis from January 1959 to December 1999.  Unreported EWMA models of the 
consumption growth series reveal fairly steady conditional volatility from 1959–1985 and 
then a sharp decline from 1985–1999. 
To test for a structural break in the volatility of real consumption growth, the 
series is ARMA(3,1) modeled and the residuals tested using the methods of Inclán and 
Tiao (1994) and Chen and Gupta (1997).  Both tests report very clear evidence (p-values 
<1%) of a structural break in volatility.  The Chen & Gupta test identifies the structural 
break in January 1992, while Inclán and Tiao points to March 1985.  Again, the average 
of these two dates is taken as the basis for estimating 1 , 1 , 2 , 2 ; the pre- and 
post-break parameters of the normal distributions that describe the ARMA residuals of 
real aggregate consumption growth.  The estimated volatility parameters are 
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0.381%=1  and 0.263%.=2   These two states are referred to as “Medium” and 
“Low” macroeconomic risk respectively.  A third state, 3=s , that represents “High” 
risk, is also introduced, to reflect the possibility that the economy might return to the 
conditions experienced during the inter-war years.  Because of the measurement error 
issues discussed above, it is difficult to accurately calibrate 3 , 3 , but the results have 
low sensitivity to these values.  Baseline calibrations are based upon 13 =   and 
13 2=  . 
The transition matrix is: 
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1112
 (14) 
The average time spent in the Low and High risk states on each visit, at ),1/(1   is 
twice as long as the average time spent in the Medium risk state on each visit.  I set 
360=)1/(1   months.  As visits to the middle state are twice as frequent as to the 
extreme states, the economy spends an equal amount of time in each state asymptotically.  
As before, initial probabilities are set equal so as not to impose strong prior beliefs on the 
data; (1):21959P  =  (2):21959P  =  (3):21959P  1/3= .  Figure IV presents the estimated 
probabilities of being in each of the three states.  Again, the reduction in 
macroeconomic risk over the period 1985–1995 is clearly revealed.  Although the 
precise method used is different, this figure can be compared directly with Figure 4 in 
Lettau, Ludvigson, and Wachter (2008). 
 
[Insert Figure IV around here] 
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Monthly share price and dividend series are taken from Hallerbach (2005) which, 
in turn, are based on the Wilson and Jones (2002) data set.  For robustness, in 
unreported results, I also estimated monthly dividends from the capital-growth only and 
total returns indices of the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ taken from CRSP.  Results are 
largely insensitive to which series is used.  The risk-free rate data come from CRSP.  
These series are deflated using the CPI index from Robert Shiller's website.  The share 
repurchase adjustor to the dividend series from Grullon and Michaely (2002) is converted 
to monthly values using a cubic spline method.  The data are finally converted to 
quarterly to overcome seasonality issues in dividend payments and then ARMA(5,2) 
modeled. 
The asset pricing model was calibrated in this case using a Monte Carlo method 
based on quarterly data from 1959:1 to 1999:4: 
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jt  is the equity premium discount factor applied at time t  for a cash flow with horizon 
j .  A formal definition of this variables for the two-state model is given in equation (A5) 
in the Appendix; an analogous version is used in this three state version.  For each 
quarter in the sample, the variable is numerically estimated using 5000 Monte Carlo 
iterations for 2000<j .  Then, for each quarter and each 1,2000][j , 5000 iterations 
are run to calculate the value of      
j
k kftktt
rgE
1
exp with kftkt rg    simulated 
using the ARMA(5,2) process with parameters and residuals taken from the observed 
data.  The ex ante equity premium levels are taken to be 4.5%/4=(1) , 
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2.5%/4=(2)  and 8%/4=(3) .   
Figure V presents the observed and estimated log price series both when the 
equity premium is time-varying (the full model) and when it is fixed at 4.5%/4  for all 
states (the partial model).  For the combined bear and bull period from 
1965:Q3–1999:Q4, the time-varying equity premium model is highly accurate in 
explaining the average real capital gain to the market.  The estimated value is 0.84% per 
quarter, which is closer to the observed value of 0.86% than the partial model estimate of 
0.59%.  This results in the retrodicted level of the market being 39% higher in 1999 
when using the full model than the partial model.  The improvement comes mainly from 
the final part of the sample.  Allowing for the third equity premium state drives up the 
retrodicted average annual real capital growth to the market from 4.9% to 6.9% for the 
1982–1999 secular bull market.  The full model, though, does not help improve our 
understanding of the secular bear market of 1966–1981.  
 
[Insert Figure V around here] 
 
I conjecture that the reason why this bear market occurred is because of the type 
of low probability disaster event described in an equity premium context by Reitz (1988), 
Barro (2006, 2009) and Martin (2008).  If investors allocate a small probability to a very 
severe negative event, then this can have a significant impact on the ex ante equity 
premium and hence the value of the market.  The event about which investors worried 
need not then be observed in the ex post data.  The secular bear market of 1966–1981 
coincided with much of the Cold War, nuclear weapon proliferation and the oil crisis.  
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That the perceived level of macroeconomic risk increased during this time seems rational, 
even if this is not reflected in the subsequent consumption data.  When observed 
consumption risk fell further in the late 1980s, then this may also have been associated 
with a decline in the perceived risk of future economic disaster.  The bull market of 
1982–1999 is then driven by three factors; a “catch-up” from the 1970s as investors 
worried less about possible future economic catastrophe, strong dividend plus stock 
repurchase performance and a decline in measured macroeconomic volatility. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
In this article, I present an asset pricing model that performs well at explaining low 
frequency movements in the S&P 500 index during the twentieth century.  The model is 
founded on the observation that the level of macroeconomic risk faced by stockholders 
has changed significantly over time.  This, in turn, would have had a major impact on 
the ex ante equity premium.  In particular, the bull markets of 1922–1928 and 
1949–1965 occurred during periods of falling risk, while macroeconomic uncertainty rose 
greatly during the Wall Street Crash.  This article also shows that, at least based on 
annual data, there is little evidence of significant excess volatility in stock returns. 
The full model can also help explain other stylized facts about low frequency 
stock returns.  Mehra and Prescott (2003) note that there was a rapid change in the 
equity premium around 1933, which they attribute to the United States coming off the 
Gold Standard.  An alternative explanation arises from the model in this article. From 
unreported EWMA estimates of consumption risk, 1932 represents the year of highest 
perceived macroeconomic risk in the whole of the twentieth century; a feature that is not 
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surprising given the Great Depression.  In contrast, EWMA estimates based on monthly 
data from 1959 show that November 1999 had the lowest perceived macroeconomic risk.  
In addition, in the three years preceding 1934, real log aggregate dividend growth had 
averaged -23% per year.  By contrast, in the three years preceding 2000, real aggregate 
dividends plus stock repurchases had grown on average by 9.9% a year.  Under a 
Gordon growth model with time-varying parameters, the discount rate would have been 
considerably higher in 1933 than 2000 and the expected future dividend growth rate 
much lower.  As a consequence, the full model retrodicts average annual real capital 
growth of 0.9%  for 1890–1932 while the observed value was 1.1% .  For the 
1933–1999 period, the figures are 3.4%  ( 4.2%  when allowing for the three-state 
model of Section V) and 4.2%  respectively. 
If consumption risk has really declined in the second half of the century, then this 
should lead to other observable effects in asset pricing.  In particular, we might look for 
an increase in the real risk-free rate associated with a decline in the precautionary savings 
demand.
8
  Casual inspection reveals this phenomenon.  From 1897–1948 the real 
risk-free rate averaged 0.8%  per annum, while from 1949–1999 it averaged 1.3% .  
There are, though, many other potential explanations for this effect and this issue 
deserves a more detailed study in its own right. 
                                                     
8
  Indeed, it is at least theoretically possible that, even though the equity premium declined in the second 
half of the century, the overall cost of equity could have increased due to an offsetting diminishing 
precautionary savings effect of greater magnitude.  The small rise in the observed real risk-free rate does 
not, though, seem to be sufficiently large to dominate the significant fall in the equity premium. 
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Appendix - The Asset Pricing Model 
This Appendix provides details of the asset pricing model used in this article.  The first 
subsection explains how equation (13) follows from equation (11).  It also shows how 
the variables 1x , 2x  can be estimated using Monte Carlo methods.  The second 
subsection shows how highly similar results can be derived using the log-linear model of 
Campbell and Shiller (1988).   
 
The Term Structure of Equity Discount Premia 
The baseline calibrations in this article calculate state probabilities, )(sPt , based on 
income growth volatility, while the equity premium depends on the conditional volatility 
of consumption, )( 1ctt r .  The link between aggregate consumption and income 
volatility is explored in the literature on consumption smoothness (see, for example, 
Campbell and Deaton 1989).  Realized change in consumption over the interval 
1],[ tt  will depend on the change in permanent income over the same period and so the 
conditional volatility of income will directly influence the conditional volatility of 
consumption.  This relation can be clearly seen in the values of (1)tP  presented in 
Figure I for the period when both income and consumption data are available. Although 
there is some disagreement over the exact timing of regime changes, particularly 
following WWII, it is clear that both series give highly similar patterns. As a 
consequence, the main results of this article, presented in Table 4, are largely insensitive 
to whether (1)tP  is estimated from income or consumption data apart from in the 
1937–1948 bear market subperiod. Because of the higher quality of income data in the 
first half of the century, this article bases its main calibrations on income based estimates 
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of (1)tP . 
To formally establish the relation between (1)tP  as estimated from income data 
and  1ctt r , let ty  denote income of the representative rich household and 
)/(ln= 1   ttt yyG  log income growth.  To capture autocorrelation in income growth 
in a simple manner, assume that it follows an MA(1) process, 
,= 110    ttt eebaG where te  is taken to be independently and normally 
distributed.   From Table 1, this MA(1) process fits a number of the fractile groups' 
average income growth well, including P99–99.5, which has similar first order 
autocorrelation and standard deviation to series P95–100.   Consistent with the main 
model in the article, it is assumed that te  is heteroskedastic and follows a two-state 
Markov switching process.  For consistency with the P99–99.5 series, 
)(0,8.19%0.2651,= 21 Neb t   for state 1 and )(0,3.06%
2Net   for state 2.  
However, I set 0.0035=0  , which is well below the empirical estimate ( 0.0115=0 ). 
The reason for this choice is that, with rapidly growing income, the permanent income 
hypothesis predicts high initial consumption, leading to unrealistic implied borrowing 
levels. The value of 0  is chosen so that initial consumption is close to the level of 
initial income, making the implicit saving and borrowing decisions more realistic.  The 
results presented below have low sensitivity to this choice of 0 .   
The representative household makes consumption and savings decisions based on 
its expectation of current and future income. Unfortunately, under constant relative risk 
aversion, which forms the basis for the Consumption CAPM, there is no currently known 
solution to the optimal consumption problem (Zeldes, 1989).  Therefore, a very simple 
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permanent income hypothesis model is used where the risk-free rate is constant at r . 
Optimal consumption is then given by (Deaton, 1992): 
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where tW  denotes capital wealth at time t.  Given the income generation process, an 
optimal consumption path then follows: 
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 (A2) 
To calculate the expectations in sY  for 1,000 , a Monte Carlo method is used over 
10,000 iterations.  As in the main simulations, there is a 2% probability of a change in 
state each period.  The real risk-free rate is taken as 2% and initial capital wealth set 
equal to zero. 
To examine the relation between (1)tP  and )(
2
1 ctt r , the MA(1) income process 
is simulated 500 times for 100 years' worth of data with a structural shift in income risk 
generated at the 50th data point.  Based on these simulated MA(1) residuals, I repeat the 
standard process for estimating a structural break in risk and the probability of being in 
the two states, )(sPt . For 446 of the 500 simulations, both the Chen and Gupta and 
Inclán and Tiao tests identify a structural decline in the volatility at a level of statistical 
significance of less than 1% and place the break in the interval [Year 40, Year 60]. 
For the 446 out of 500 simulations where a structural break is identified in income 
growth residuals in the interval [Year 40, Year 60] by both the Chen and Gupta and 
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Inclán and Tiao tests at the 1% significance level, the same tests are run on the 
consumption growth data estimated using equation (A2).  In 436 of these 446 cases, 
both tests also recognize a decline in the volatility of consumption growth at the same 
level of significance and in the same interval.  In 88% of these 436 cases, for both tests 
there is perfect agreement between the consumption and income series over the identified 
date of the break.  New values of (1)tP  are also calculated based on the consumption 
series.  The average correlation between the (1)tP  series as generated from the income 
and consumption data across the 446 simulations is 99.3% and in no case is the 
correlation less than 90%. 
Given the similarity of estimates of (1)tP  from income and consumption data, it 
then follows that  
  22212212 (1))(   tctt Pr  (A3) 
where s  refers to the consumption (not income) growth volatility in each state.  To 
test this, for each year 1914–1986, the current optimal level of consumption is calculated 
based on the income level, the MA residual and the estimate of (1)tP  based on the 
P99–99.5  data for that period with 0.0035=0   and with current wealth set equal to 
zero.  Then, for each year, 10,000 Monte Carlo simulations are run for next period's 
income.  With probability (1)tP  ( (1))1 tP , 1te  is drawn from a normal distribution 
with standard deviation 8.19%  (3.06%) .  Based on this drawing, a new estimate of 
(1)1tP  can be calculated. Given this, for each of these Monte Carlo runs, the optimal 
consumption next period can be calculated based on equation (A2).  Based on this and 
next periods' projected consumption, for each year we have 10,000 simulations of 1ctr .  
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Calculation of a time series of )( 1
2
ctt r  over the period 1914–1986 is then 
straightforward.  This series can then be used in the OLS regression, 
(1))( 1
2
tctt BPAr  , over the interval 1914–1986, where the values of (1)tP  are again 
estimated from income data.  The 2R  of this equation is 99.9%, showing the accuracy 
of the linear approximation. Empirical estimates of 2s  can be derived directly from A  
and B . 
Within the framework of this article, time variation in the equity premium is 
driven by heteroskedasticity in consumption growth alone.  From equation (1), it then 
follows that )(= 1 kctktkt r    for constant )(),(= itctit RrR  .  Equation (A3) 
implies that (1)= 1  ktkt BPA .  Define ss  =)( , which represents the single 
period equity premium that would currently prevail if next period's state was revealed as 
s  immediately; 1=)(1 sP kt  .  Then the single period equity premium is given by: 
  (2)(1)(1)(2)= 2212    ktkt P  (A4) 
Combining equations (8) and (A4) allows for the term structure of the equity premium 
discount factor to be calculated: 
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As (1),  (2)  are constants, jt  is time dependent only through (1)1ktP  making it 
relatively easy to estimate this equation through Monte Carlo simulation.  For all 
{0%,(1)tP  1%,  2%,  ...,  100%}, with probability (1)tP  ( (1))1 tP , 1te  is drawn 
from a normal distribution with standard deviation 8.19%  (3.06%) .  Based on this 
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drawing, (1)1tP  can be calculated in the usual way.  This process is iterated to 
calculate (1)jtP  and all values of {1,1000)j .  By repeating this process 5,000 
times, jt  can be numerically estimated.   
For asset pricing purposes, the key variables are not jt  themselves but the 
summation jtjj 

1=
.  The Monte Carlo results reveal that, to very high 
approximation ( 99.5%>2R ) this summation is linear in (1)tP : 
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where sx  are the Monte Carlo values from the cases 1,0=(1)tP .  Intuitively, the 
accuracy of this approximation is unsurprising as it would hold exactly, through the law 
of conditional expectations, if sx  were conditioned on 1=1st  rather than 1=)(sPt .  
As 1st  is not observable to investors, the conditioning in equation (A6) is more useful 
for calibration purposes and the linear approximation is highly precise. 
By combining equations (A6) and (11), the main pricing equation; equation (13); 
follows directly.  For calibration purposes, the values of sx  are calculated using the 
Monte Carlo method described above.   
 
The Log-linear Model of Campbell & Shiller (1988) 
An alternative approach might involve the use of the log-linear model of Campbell and 
Shiller (1988): 
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 (A7) 
where    denotes a sample average.  It is necessary to be careful about the distinction 
between jtm  , which is the log of an expected single period simple return and jt , 
which is a log return:  )(exp=)(exp 1 jtjtjt Em   .  If log returns are normally 
distributed with constant variance ,2    21 0.5=   jtjtjt mE .  By the law of 
iterated expectations,  jttE   =   )(1 jtjtt EE    =    20.5 jtt mE , Campbell and 
Shiller's model can be rewritten as: 
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As for the main model, approximate ktm   kftkt r   )(1ln   and, for calibration 
purposes, the value of 2  is estimated from the total sample.  Under the MA(1) 
process for the dividend growth rate minus the risk-free rate,   tfttt rgE  1011 =    
and   011 =  jftjtt rgE  for all 0>j .  Then: 
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Substituting for jt  from equation (A4) gives: 
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For each year in the sample, a Monte Carlo simulation is run to calculate the expectation 
based on that period's value of (1)tP  using 10,000 iterations for 1,000<j .  The 
correlation between this simulated capital growth series and the baseline calibration is 
99.7%.  Price levels are similar, with the values from the Campbell and Shiller (1998) 
model being, on average, around 9% higher than those from the Ang and Liu (2004) 
model.  The Ang and Liu (2004) is preferred for baseline calibrations as it is less reliant 
on historic data averages and so can be seen as more of a pure ex ante model.   
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TABLE 1:  Descriptive Statistics for Income and Consumption Growth. 
  P0-90 P90-95 P95-99 P99-99.5 P99.5-99.9 P99.9-99.99 P99.99-100 P95-100 Consump. 
Observations 81 81 81 85 85 85 85 81 111 
Mean 1.25% 1.56% 1.52% 1.44% 1.16% 0.75% 1.29% 1.29% 1.95% 
Standard deviation 7.01% 4.27% 4.27% 6.20% 7.98% 10.70% 15.03% 5.96% 3.13% 
Skewness 0.11 -1.02 -0.86 -0.51 -0.28 0.05 0.08 -0.70 -0.48 
Excess kurtosis 2.93 2.68 2.52 1.45 1.10 1.30 1.89 1.74 1.55 
Chi-Squared for Normality 23.46*** 12.37*** 11.60*** 7.33** 5.62* 7.60** 12.99*** 8.26** 9.43*** 
1st order autocorrelation 45.62% 36.18% 13.15% 25.94% 12.57% 9.72% 24.16% 21.65% -16.89% 
2nd order autocorrelation 4.94% -9.26% 4.52% -3.05% 1.60% 0.68% 2.01% 7.16% 15.13% 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller -5.763*** -6.707*** -8.825*** -6.171*** -7.453*** -7.960*** -6.811*** -7.808*** -12.14*** 
ARMA Model AR(2) MA(1) Constant MA(1) Constant Constant MA(1) ARMA(2,2) ARMA(2,2) 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the real logarithmic growth rate in income for various income fractiles and for aggregate consumption.  The 
income data are taken from Piketty and Saez (2003) and the consumption data from Robert Shiller's website.  
***, **, * Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively for the Chi-Squared and Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests. 
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TABLE 2: Stuctural Break in Volatility Tests for Income and Consumption Growth. 
Percentile P0-90 P90-95 P95-99 P99-99.5 P99.5-99.9 P99.9-99.99 P99.99-100 P95-100 Consump 
Observations 81 81 81 73 73 73 73 69 111 
Panel A: First Identified Structural Break in Volatility; Log Growth 
Chen & Gupta break date 1946 1947 1947 1950 1950 1952 1938 1950 1947 
Chen & Gupta p-value <1% <1% <1% <1% <1% <1% <1% <1% <1% 
Inclan & Tiao break date 1946 1947 1947 1941 1941 1951 1938 1939 1936 
Inclan & Tiao p-value <1% <1% <1% <1% <1% <1% <1% <1% <1% 
Panel B: First Identified Structural Break in Volatility; ARMA Residuals 
Chen & Gupta break date 1959 1959 1947 1950 1950 1952 1939 1951 1936 
Chen & Gupta p-value <1% <1% <1% <1% <1% <1% <1% <1% <1% 
Inclan & Tiao break date 1943 1948 1947 1950 1941 1951 1939 1948 1936 
Inclan & Tiao p-value <1% <1% <1% <1% <1% <1% <1% <1% <1% 
Panel C: Pre and Post Break Volatility of ARMA Residuals             
Taken date of break 1951 1953 1947 1950 1945 1951 1939 1949 1936 
Std before break 8.88% 5.33% 6.18% 8.19% 10.81% 12.87% 20.09% 7.58% 4.03% 
Std after break 2.90% 2.24% 2.61% 3.06% 4.43% 4.69% 7.19% 2.63% 1.53% 
Panel D:  MSVAR Regimes for ARMA Residuals       
Break date 1959 1951 Multiple  1951 1951 1952 1941 1951 1938 
Std before break 8.16% 5.27% - 7.97% 10.26% 12.48% 18.83% 7.34% 3.90% 
Std after break 2.31% 2.19% - 3.01% 3.66% 4.43% 7.02% 2.46% 1.51% 
This table presents evidence of single stuctural breaks in volatility for real annual income and aggregate consumption growth rate data.  Tests used are 
Chen & Gupta (1997) and Inclan & Tiao (1994) based on logarithmic real growth and the ARMA residuals of log real growth. p values for the 
rejection of the null of no structural break are given together with the date identified as being the most likely for the structural break in volatility.  The 
date taken for the break is the average of the dates identified by the Chen & Gupta and Inclan & Tiao tests.  Pre-break and post-break standard 
deviation estimates are provided. Panel D reports the structural breaks in volatility identified by the MSVAR package, written by Krolzig in Ox, that 
uses a maximum likelihood EM algorithm. 
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TABLE 3:  Descriptive Statistics for Dividend Growth and the Risk-free Rate. 
      g    frg   
1890-2000 fr    W&J GFD Shiller   W&J GFD Shiller 
Mean 1.30%  1.47% 1.61% 1.66%  0.17% 0.32% 0.37% 
Standard deviation 4.70%  12.82% 12.23% 12.82%  13.49% 12.85% 13.12% 
Skewness -0.55  -0.27 -0.26 -0.25  -0.14 -0.34 -0.39 
Kurtosis 3.71  4.18 3.37 3.42  4.06 3.53 4.07 
Chi-Squared for normality 31.91***  45.42*** 34.70*** 41.44***  47.60*** 34.62*** 45.36*** 
Correlation with frg   -31.44%  93.75% 93.09% 93.46%  - - - 
1st order autocorrelation 65.5%  15.2% 21.3% 9.4%  17.1% 22.8% 11.1% 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller -5.399***   -7.733*** -8.124*** -9.205***   -10.49*** -10.21*** -10.45*** 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the real risk-free rate, fr , the real logarithmic growth in dividends, g , and the difference between these 
two variables, frg  .  “W&J” = Wilson and Jones (2002).  “GFD”=Global Financial Data. “Shiller” is Robert Shiller's unlagged data.   
*** Significant at the 1% level for the Chi-Squared and Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests. 
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TABLE 4: Observed and Retrodicted Average Annual Growth Rates of the S&P500. 
     Panel A: WJ Data   Panel B: GFD Data   Panel C: Shiller+1 
 Observed Partial p value Full p-value Consump. p value  Observed Full  Observed Full 
Mean                             
1897 – 1905 7.7% 6.2% 53.6% 7.4% 1.6% 7.4% 1.6% 7.3% 6.7% 6.5% 7.2% 
1906 – 1921 -6.5% -3.6% 46.0% -4.2% 7.6% -4.4% 5.3% -6.4% -3.9% -6.2% -3.3% 
1922 – 1928 16.2% 7.8% 51.6% 12.0% 0.1% 10.3% 0.5% 17.3% 15.4% 17.3% 13.5% 
1929 – 1948 -4.0% -0.5% 45.5% -2.1% 0.1% -0.2% 84.4% -4.1% -2.9% -4.1% -2.4% 
1949 – 1965 8.6% 3.9% 48.1% 6.9% 0.0% 5.5% 0.2% 9.0% 7.7% 9.0% 6.4% 
1966 – 1981 -5.0% -1.1% 46.0% -1.2% 35.6% -1.1% 42.1% -5.0% -1.2% -5.4% -1.3% 
1982 – 1999 10.6%  5.3% 50.6% 5.3% 38.1% 5.3% 40.9%  10.6% 5.3%  10.6% 4.9% 
Mean                             
1929 – 1932 -26.5% -10.8% 40.3% -19.0% 0.0% -15.4% 0.8% -24.9% -22.5% -24.3% -23.4% 
1933 – 1936 22.1% 13.7% 56.6% 13.7% 56.2% 13.8% 36.6% 21.2% 17.1% 20.5% 16.4% 
1937 – 1948 -5.3%  -1.8% 45.0% -1.8% 51.7% 0.2% 99.9%  -5.5% -3.0%  -5.6% -1.6% 
Standard deviation               
1897 – 1948 22.3% 19.2% 20.9% 20.3%  22.7% 19.8% 21.5% 18.9% 
1949 – 1999 16.0% 11.6% 12.9% 12.3%  16.3% 13.5% 15.0% 11.6% 
Observed and estimated average annual real capital growth rates to the stock market over secular bull and bear markets of the twentieth century.  
“W&J” = Wilson and Jones (2002).  “GFD”=Global Financial Data. “Shiller+1” is Robert Shiller's data lagged one year.  “Partial'” is retrodicted 
returns from equation (12).  “Full” and “Consump.” are both based on equation (13), with the former being calibrated on a mix of income and 
consumption data, while the latter is calibrated on the basis of consumption data alone.  p values are calculated from Monte Carlo simulations with 
randomized consumption growth data. 
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TABLE 5: Sensitivity Analysis for the Retrodicted Average Annual Growth Rates of the S&P500. 
      Panel A: Transition Probability   Panel B: Equity Premia 
       )1( = 7% )1( = 7% )1(  = 9% )1( = 9% 
 Observed   = 0.90  =0.95   = 0.99  )2(  = 2.5% )2(  = 4.5% )2(  = 2.5% )2(  = 4.5% 
Mean                     
1897 – 1905 7.7% 6.9% 7.3% 7.3% 7.6% 6.8% 8.1% 7.3% 
1906 – 1921 -6.5% -3.9% -4.1% -4.1% -4.3% -3.9% -4.5% -4.1% 
1922 – 1928 16.2% 9.0% 10.3% 12.4% 12.6% 10.0% 13.9% 11.5% 
1929 – 1948 -4.0% -1.1% -1.5% -2.2% -2.4% -1.3% -2.9% -1.9% 
1949 – 1965 8.6% 4.7% 5.5% 8.1% 7.3% 5.6% 8.2% 6.6% 
1966 – 1981 -5.0% -1.2% -1.2% -1.2% -1.2% -1.2% -1.2% -1.2% 
1982 – 1999 10.6%  5.3% 5.3% 5.3%  5.3% 5.3% 5.3% 5.3% 
Mean                     
1929 – 1932 -26.5% -13.8% -16.2% -19.6% -20.2% -15.1% -23.0% -18.0% 
1933 – 1936 22.1% 13.7% 13.7% 13.7% 13.7% 13.7% 13.7% 13.7% 
1937 – 1948 -5.3%  -1.8% -1.8% -1.8%  -1.8% -1.8% -1.7% -1.8% 
Standard deviation           
1897 – 1948 22.3% 19.4% 19.9% 21.3% 21.4% 19.7% 22.6% 20.5% 
1949 – 1999 16.0% 12.3% 12.7% 13.0% 13.2% 12.3% 13.7% 12.8% 
1897 – 1999 19.5%  16.2% 16.7% 17.7%  17.8% 16.4% 18.7% 17.1% 
This table is similar to Table 4 for the W&J data set and the full model.  Panel A presents results for different transition probabilities between states; 
 . The higher  , the more persistent the state.  Panel B considers different levels of the equity premium before ( (1) ) and after ( (2) ) the structural 
shift in macroeconomic volatility.  All other variables are as for the base case. 
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Figure I.  Estimated State Probabilities. 
 
This figure provides the Bayesian probabilities of being in the high risk state, (1)tP , next 
period as estimated from the three income series and the real aggregate consumption 
growth series. 
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Figure II.  Retrodicted Price Series.   
 
This is a replication of Figure 1 in Shiller (2003) from 1890 with the logarithm of 
retrodicted prices from the full and partial models added.  The four lines from the Shiller 
exhibit show the logarithm of observed real prices and simulated prices from three 
models.  The “PDV, Constant Discount Rate” model is that of Shiller (1981).  The 
“PDV, Interest Rate” model allows for the discount rate to vary with short-term interest 
rates.  The “PDV, Consumption” model is that of Grossman and Shiller (1981) that 
allows for the discount rate to vary with the marginal rate of substitution for real 
per-capita consumption.  
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Figure III.  Retrodicted Price / Dividend Ratios. 
 
This graph compares the retrodicted price / dividend ratios from the full and partial 
models against the observed values based on Shiller's data.  The graph also presents the 
“perfect knowledge” retrodicted values, where it is assumed that investors could identify 
instantaneously the regime change in 1949 without the requirement to undertake 
Bayesian learning. 
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Figure IV.  Estimated State Probabilities 1959–1999. 
 
The probability of being in the “Medium” , “Low” and High” risk macroeconomic states 
based on monthly real aggregate consumption growth rates of non-durables and services 
1959M2–1999M12. 
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Figure V.  Retrodicted Price Series, 1960–1999. 
 
The observed logarithmic price of the market from 1960 to 1999 and the retrodicted log 
price based on quarterly consumption and dividend data.  The probabilities used to 
estimate the changing equity premium are given in Figure IV. 
 
 
 
